This paper presents the results of a corpus-based investigation of the role of the firstperson plural pronoun in the construction of intersubjective meaning among evidential perception verbs in written and spoken English and German (mainly written). Whereas the first-person singular pronoun only signifies that the evidence rests solely with the speaker/writer, the first-person plural pronoun allows a much wider range of intersubjective meanings concerning the nature of the evidence. It is also shown how English and German perception verbs express intersubjective evidential meaning in a number of different complementation patterns, how the type of this meaning is often linked to these patterns, and how the use of the first-person plural pronoun can vary among and within these constructions.
Introduction
Recent investigations into the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of perception verbs-those verbs denoting sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste-has revealed that this group of verbs provide a key means of lexical realizations of evidential meaning in languages such as English and German (Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Gisborne 2010; Whitt 2009 Whitt , 2010 Whitt , 2011 .
1 Consider, for example, the following:
(1) a. I hear Judith singing a Petula Clark song. b.
Ich höre Judith ein Lied von Petula Clark singen.
In (1a) and its German equivalent (1b), the speaker indicates that Judith is singing one of Petula Clark's songs, and that s/he has auditory evidence that this event is taking place. That is, the speaker knows Judith is singing because s/he hears it happening.
But notice how the nature of the evidence changes a bit when the first-person plural pronoun is used:
1 Aikhenvald (2004) argues that the category of evidentiality should be restricted to grammatically obligatory verbal inflections, hence evidentiality cannot be said to exist in languages such as English and German. For counterarguments to this position, see Diewald and Smirnova (2010) . A number of scholars (Chafe 1986; Traugott 1997; Smirnova 2006; Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Diewald and Smirnova 2010; Gisborne 2010; Whitt 2010) have identified aspects of evidentiality in English and German, and I will do the same here.
(2) a.
We hear Judith singing a Petula Clark song. b.
Wir hören Judith ein Lied von Petula Clark singen.
Here, the speaker indicates that s/he is not the only one who has heard Judith sing, but that an unspecified number (at least within this sentence) of other people have heard the event take place as well. That is, the evidence is accessible by a group of people rather than a single individual.
It has been taken for granted that evidentiality is a deictic category, as it involves speakers (or writers) providing evidence for the propositions they utter (Jakobson 1957 (Jakobson [1971 ; de Haan 2001; Joseph 2003) . Therefore, a sentence such as
Mark hears Judith singing a Petula Clark song / Markus hört Judith ein Lied von
Petula Clark singen would not be considered evidential because the speaker is not indicating s/he is in possession of any particular evidence for the proposition, but merely that some third person has auditorily perceived an event (cf. Biber and Finegan's 1989 distinction between "speaker stance" and "secondary stance"). But what else besides evidence does a speaker/writer (hereafter S/W) index when s/he uses the first-person plural pronoun as the grammatical subject of an evidential perception verb? It was shown in Whitt (2011) that the use of the first-person plural pronoun allows the S/W not only to indicate that s/he-along with others-is in possession of perceptual evidence, but it also allows the S/W to "engage" the audience with the evidence (Hyland 2005; cf. Nuyts 2001) : that is, the use of the firstperson plural pronoun can allow the S/W to bring certain evidence to the audience's attention, use the evidence in a persuasive manner, and perhaps even concede that multiple interpretations of the same perceptual evidence are possible. This variety of uses does not occur when the singular first-person pronoun is used.
This essay will expand on arguments made in Whitt (2011) and focus exclusively on the use of the first-person plural pronoun in English (we) and German (wir) with evidential perception verbs. I will first provide a general overview of evidential perception verbs, then focus on the notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity as they relate to the first-person plural pronoun, discuss the corpora consulted for this study, and examine the behavior of the first-person plural pronoun among evidential uses of the verbs of visual (see, sehen) and auditory (hear, hören) perception in English and German.
The (Evidential) Verbs of Perception
Before embarking on our study of the first-person plural pronoun and evidential perception verbs, a few comments and delineations concerning this group of verbs is necessary. It is well known that there are five sensory modalities-sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste-covered by perception verbs in English and German.
However, not all of these modalities share equal status when in comes to verb frequency and semantic content. In his cross-linguistic typological study of perception verbs, Viberg (1983) found that certain sub-groups (i.e. verbs signifying specific modalities) enjoyed greater frequency in usage and a higher degree of polysemy than others. Hence he established the following hierarchy:
Thus in a number of the world's languages, perception verbs denoting those modalities higher up (to the left) in the hierarchy evinced greater frequency and polysemy than modalities lower down in the hierarchy. These findings have been at least partly confirmed by later research conducted by Sweetser (1990) , Harm (2000) , and Whitt (2010) . In addition, a distinction is often drawn between "subject-oriented"
and "object-oriented" perception verbs (Viberg 1983; Harm 2000; Whitt 2009 Whitt , 2010  cf. Gisborne 2010 for a slightly different yet not unrelated classification scheme).
"Subject-oriented" perception verbs are transitive verbs where the grammatical subject of the clause is also the perceiver, and they focus on the act of perception itself. Hear and hören in (1) and (2) are good examples. "Object-oriented" perception verbs, on the other hand, are intransitive and focus on the stimulus of perception as the grammatical subject of the clause, e.g. The music sounds loud. The object-oriented perception verbs are not irrelevant to discussions of evidentiality, but as they play a less significant role in constructions of collectivity and intersubjectivity than subjectoriented verbs do (Whitt 2011 ), they will not be discussed further in this study.
So what makes an perception verb evidential? It was mentioned in Section 1 that there must be a deictic component present, whereby the S/W points to his or her perception as the source of information for the proposition. But since subject-oriented perception verbs can be evidential only when a first-person grammatical subject appears, we must tease out this additional deictic component from the already existing indexical presence of person deixis via the pronoun. Contrast (3) from (4):
Ich sehe das Haus.
(4) a. I see the house burning. b.
Ich sehe das Haus brennen.
In (3), the S/W states that s/he visually perceives a house, but this visual perception of an object is not evidence for some other proposition. In (4), however, this act of visual perception (proposition 1) provides the evidence for the second proposition in the sentence: namely, the house is burning. It is this additional deictic component of the S/W linking his or her act of perception as evidence for another proposition that is necessary for the perception verb to become evidential. 2 The different syntactic configurations where one finds evidential perception verbs will be discussed in more detail in Section 5. And on a final note, the high degree of polysemy one sees evinced by perception verbs in general appears in the evidential domain as well (Sweetser 1990; Harm 2000; Whitt 2010 ): verbs of visual perception can point to evidence of a cognitive nature (like knowledge and understanding), auditory verbs can also be markers of hearsay, and verbs of tactile perception can include emotion and intuition in their stock of evidential meanings. And all verbs-including those of olfaction and gustation-point to inference as the source of evidence, while the connection between this inference and the source sensory modality can vary tremendously, i.e. the inference may or may not be based on the sensory modality of the verb in question.
Sometimes the relationship is purely metaphorical. This issue of polysemy will also be taken up in Section 5.
Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity
In very general terms, subjectivity in language concerns the degree to which the S/W's presence in the discourse is realized linguistically, and it has been of interest to linguistics for quite a long time (see, for example, Bréal 1900: 229-238) . With this very general definition, one can safely say that evidentiality is subjective because of its deictic nature. After all, it allows S/Ws to point to the evidence for the propositions they utter, thus making their presence in the discourse known. More recently, two competing-although not mutually exclusive in my opinion-views of subjectivity have gained prominence. Traugott's (1982; view of subjectivity is diachronic in nature, concerned mainly with how certain linguistic items become markers of S/W's the proposition of the subject's perception has to provide the source for the knowledge of some other event or state of affairs, i.e. the state of affairs being described adjoins to the act of perception as a secondary predication of sorts (Smirnova 2010 In (5), the S/W has visual evidence that the boat is capsizing. Anyone else who has visual access to this event should also be able to report the same thing. In (6), however, the perception verb see/sehe doesn't indicate visual perception so much as it does inference (which is probably based on visual observation). This could be considered more subjective than (5), which is based solely on an external event or stimulus. Langacker's (1990 Langacker's ( , 1999 Langacker's ( , 2008 approach to subjectivity is synchronic in nature and is more concerned with overt syntactic realizations of the deictic elements (the "ground") in the discourse. Where there is more deixis, there is more subjectivity because the S/W is more "on stage" where the events are occurring: To Langacker, (7a) would be considered maximally objective because this event description is not dependent on the S/W's point of view (that is, the S/W is maximally "off stage"). In (7b, c), on the other hand, the S/W traces a trajectory from Vanessa to someone else. And in (7d), this trajectory from Vanessa (to the self) is not even linguistically realized; the S/W is maximally "on stage" here, and the sentence is thus considered maximally subjective. Although such insights can prove helpful in dealing with evidential object-oriented perception verbs (Whitt 2011: 352) , they don't have much to say about subject-oriented perception verbs, where the overt marking of the perceiver (I or we) as subject is governed grammatically rather than pragmatically, i.e.
the S/W has no choice but to indicate who the perceiver is, and so varying degrees of Langacker's subjectivity simply don't exist.
Although briefly touched on in the work of Benveniste (1971 Benveniste ( [1966 Concerning evidentiality, Nuyts (2001: 34) has developed a litmus test for determining whether something is a marker of subjective or intersubjective evidential meaning: "does the speaker suggest that (s)he alone knows the evidence and draws a conclusion from it; or does (s)he indicate that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the conclusion based on it?" So returning to
examples (1) and (2), we can see that the auditory evidence appears to be available solely to the speaker in (1), but in (2), an unspecified number of other people in addition to the speaker have access to this evidence, as indicated by the first-person plural pronoun we. In Whitt (2011), it was shown that Nutys' criterium for distinguishing subjective and intersubjective evidentiality, although correct, fails to capture the wide array of possible intersubjective meanings found with evidential perception verbs. Not only can the S/W indicate that s/he is not the only one with access to specific perceptual evidence, but s/he can also use the first-person plural pronoun we as a means of bringing evidence to the addressee's attention, or even in an attempt to guide or manipulate the addressee's interpretation of such evidence (after all, the use of we can indicate an assumption of audience agreement, even when there is none). This is where Hyland's (2005) notion of "stance and engagement" becomes quite useful. Although evidentiality has long been acknowledged to be part of "speaker stance" (see, for example, Biber and Finegan 1989) , little has been said as to how the S/W might "engage" the audience with certain information or evidence.
According to Hyland (2005: 176) , stance is an "attitudinal dimension" and engagement is "an alignment dimension where writers acknowledge and connect to others, recognizing the presence of their readers, pulling them along with their argument, focusing their attention, acknowledging their uncertainties, including them as discourse participants, and guiding them to interpretations". And as we will soon see, it is the first-person plural pronoun we/wir that allows speakers and writers to engage their audience in a number of ways with the evidence at hand (see Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990: 168-206 for a general discussion of the semantic breadth of the first-person plural pronoun in a number of the world's languages). Both the Helsinki and ARCHER Corpora aim to be multi-genre sample corpora for the periods they cover. The Bonn Corpus is multi-genre, but it only goes until 1699. The Kant and Goethe Corpora were selected for the eighteen and nineteenth centuries because-at the time of this article's writing-no corpus for German comparable with Helsinki or ARCHER was available. The German Manchester Corpus (GerManC), which covers the period 1650-1800, has recently been completed; however, it will not be available until early 2012, which was too late for this essay. And concerning the twentieth century, the DWDS Corpus supposedly covers written and spoken German, although most of the examples found by the author come from newspapers. 
See and Sehen
In this section, I will discuss the effects of the first-person plural pronoun when it occurs as the grammatical subject of evidential see and sehen. The quantitative distribution of the complementation patterns and relative occurrences of the firstperson plural grammatical subject can be found in Tables 1 and 2 From this data we see that the use of the first-person plural pronoun as grammatical subject varies considerably within and among the English and German language corpora. For the most part, the pronoun's relative frequency is actually higher in low frequency constructions (namely, the parentheticals and external constructions), although wir does appear as subject a majority of the time in the DWDS cases of finite complementizer clause constructions-which are admittedly quite few when compared with the other corpora. Both the PV + FCC and PV + DO + NFV patterns enjoy the highest frequency of usage in both English and German, although the German wir appears as grammatical subject in these constructions more often than we does in English. And as far as diachronic developments are concerned, no clear evolution can be discerned in either English or German, for there is no clear-cut increase in frequency of we or wir from the Early Modern to the Modern period.
PV + FCC
We now turn out attention to the evidential meanings one finds when see or sehen takes a finite complementizer clause in its scope, and how the use of the first-person plural pronoun adds an intersubjective dimension to these meanings. Consider (8) ' We see more and more that countries that hitherto were our customer, have themselves transitioned to production'.
It should be more than clear from these examples that when see or sehen takes a finite complementizer clause, the type of evidence is not restricted to literal visual perception. Oftentimes there is a more metaphorical notion of knowledge or understanding at play (Sweetser 1990: 32-34; cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003) , although visual perception may still be part of the meaning as well. Some sense of observation is certainly present in (8)- (14), and it is this observation that leads to more mental processes of inference and conclusion. And we/wir certainly plays a role in how this evidence is presented to the audience. In (8), (10), and (11) on the one hand, it appears that the authors deploy the first-person plural pronoun not necessarily to indicate that a number of people have made this observation, but rather to draw this (visual) evidence to the audience's attention and explain how exactly this evidence should be perceived. Thus in (10) Goethe brings various aspects of the plant's growth-which is visually perceptable-to his audience's attention and guides them step-by-step through a series of observations. In (9), Dymond appears to go a step further with his use of we. Rather than merely bringing visual evidence to his readers' attention, he then attempts to persuade his audience that a certain conclusion should be drawn from this evidence, i.e. when exactly the gas should appear and why this is indeed the case.
These are perfect examples of Hyland's (2005) notion of "engagement": the authors use the first-person plural pronoun to bring evidence to their audience's attention and then successively guide how they view and then interpret such evidence.
PV + DO + NFV
When a perception verb takes a direct object and a non-finite verb as its complement, more literal perception than found in uses such as (9) In (12) and (14), the perception being indicated appears quite literal: the "revival" and growth of the flora in (12) and the position of the stars in (14) . Through the use of we and wir, the authors simply point out that such phenomena are there to see for anyone who cares to look. In (13), this sense of vision is more general, focusing on general observations in someone's behavior than "vision" of one particular event or phenomenon. There is also more a sense of engagement here, as the authors employ the first-person plural pronoun to draw the reader's attention to the woman's demeanor, as if they were occupying the same physical space as the woman being described. Example (15) is quite interesting, for here, not only does Goethe draw his audience along for the ride with his choice of plural pronoun subject and reflexive pronoun object, but he also suggests that his audience should engage in these intellectual pursuits when they come to find any knowledge (irgend ein Wissen) exciting or interesting. Sehen maintains its general sense of observation here, but because its object is a reflexive pronoun, the observation is of the self (or selves, thanks to wir) engaging in intellectual endeavors. Or at least Goethe suggests this is what his audience should observe themselves doing in such a situation.
Parentheticals
Parenthetical constructions are particularly interesting, for unlike the other complementation patterns, they always convey a sense of intersubjective evidentiality because "they allow the S/W to interrupt the flow of discourse and make a comment to the addressee" (Whitt 2011: 356) Erkenntnisse sind. discursive-NOM.SG realization.PL be (Kant Corpus: AA IX, Logik (1800), S. 23) 'And here mathematics has a priority over philosophy, as we see, for the insights of the former are intuitive, while those of the latter are, on the other hand, only discursive realizations'.
In both these instances, the evidential perception verb is not the main thrust of the proposition but rather a "personal aside" (Hyland 2005: 183) that allows the writer to emphasize to the reader that the specified conclusion is one that should in fact be reached when the observable evidence is taken into account. In (16), Hoole suggests that the positive effects of certain teaching practices should be clear to anyone who can observe them, while in (17), Kant suggests to his audience that they should also arrive at the conclusion that mathematics takes priority over philosophy.
External Constructions
When a perception verb appears external to a clause for which it indicates that evidence exists, the relationship is then indicated either via anaphora/cataphora or asyndeton: 'That the goals of providence may not always be those of people, we see from this: love should go more to parents than to children, but nature works the opposite way'.
In (18), Bacon points out that the credulous man is observable among the famous, and the object of see, the pronoun it, refers to information or a proposition located elsewhere in the discourse (anaphorically in this instance concerning the previous statement on the nature of credulous men), rather than a specific entity. The use of we makes clear that such observations are there for all to see. In (19), an asyndetic relationship exists between the clause involving the perception verb and the proposition for which there is observable evidence, i.e. the nature of love between parent and child. Of course, the presence of the adverb hieraus 'herefrom, from it' adds a cataphoric element as well, as it points the reader onwards for more information (although there is no formal conjunction linking the two clauses). And as with (18), the use of the first-person plural pronoun draws the reader along with Kant's observations and suggests that these observations are available not just to Kant, but to his readership as well.
Hear and Hören
We now turn our attention to evidential uses of hear and hören, verbs of auditory perception, and what role the first-person plural pronoun plays in the construction of intersubjective evidential meaning among these verbs. Tables 3 and 4 Table 4 : Frequencies of intersubjective evidential hören in German language corpora Unlike with see and sehen, the corpora do point to some sort of diachronic development with the use of the first-person plural pronoun as grammatical subject of evidential hear and hören: there is a noticeable increase in frequency of we from the Helsinki to the ARCHER Corpus, and in German, the use wir as subject increases in both the PV + FCC and parenthetical constructions.
10 On the other hand-in contrast to see and sehen-there appear to be several more instances than with the visual 10 Exactly what accounts for this infrequency is unclear, however. The DWDS Corpus, for example, appears to have a number of parentheticals involving hören that far exceeds any other corpus. This skewing may be due to a large number of newspaper texts being the source of DWDS data, so genre effect could be one of the culprits. Still, further investigations are necessary before a clear answer can be given.
perception verbs where we or wir never appears as subject of certain complementation patterns involving hear or hören. In (20), Madox appears to indicate in his diary that he-along with an unspecified number of other people-can report about the French seizure of St. Michaels because they have hearsay evidence at their disposal. In (21), although there is hearsay evidence at hand (via the prophecy), there is an additional sense of audience engagement, as Mathesisu appears to bring this evidence to the audience's attention (or at least remind them thereof) through the mention of the prophecy, i.e. he points his audience in the direction of the prophecy as the source of the hearsay evidence.
PV + FCC

PV + DO + NFV
In contrast hearsay, direct auditory perception is the dominant type of evidence one finds in this construction, and the use of the first-person plural pronoun signals that this evidence is available to more people than just the S/W alone: Both events being described here are ones which can be perceived directly rather than indirectly through hearsay: the firing of muskets in (22) and the praising of worthless poems (nulle Gedichte) in (23). And both these events are perceived by a number of people besides the S/W (or, in the case of (23), assumed to have been perceived by others in addition to Goethe himself). This complementation is not completely inconducive to marking hearsay evidence, however: in English, the use of the particle of in this construction shifts the focus from direct auditory perception to hearsay: In this instance, the arrival of the "troops and ships" is not perceived directly, but only reported to have happened. And the S/W, associating himself with a larger speech community through the use of we rather than I, indicates he is not the only one is possession of this hearsay evidence.
Parentheticals
When verbs of hearing appear in parenthetical constructions, they are always indicators of hearsay rather than direct auditory perception: Neither the behavior of Young's wife in (25) nor the actions of the Ministry of Public Works in (26) are-or can be for that matter-perceived by direct auditory perception. Rather, the writers here indicate that this is reported information, and they then make these reports (hearsay) available to their audience through the use of the first-person plural pronoun.
External Constructions
Unfortunately, in all of the examined corpora, there was only one instance of a firstperson plural grammatical subject appearing with a verb of auditory perception in an external construction. Our attestation comes from the Bonn Corpus of Early New ' We have heard it with our ears, our fathers told it to us: one day declares the word to the other, and one night gives scholarship to the other'.
Here, the perception is not of any particular event, but rather of a set phrase that has been passed down through the generations. Still, the content of the phrase could well be considered hearsay, and the evidence at hand (the propositional content of the set phrase) is one of received wisdom or common knowledge rather than completely new information (see Willett 1988 , cf. Sweetser 1990 .
Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to show how the use of the first-person plural pronoun with evidential verbs of perception allows speakers and writers not only to indicate their evidence for the proposition, but also to "engage" (Hyland 2005 ) their audience with the evidence at hand. Both English and German, the two languages under examination here, show great similarity in this domain. Instead of merely indicating the presence of evidence, which is what occurs with the first-person singular pronoun, the use of we and wir allows speakers and writers to indicate they share certain evidence with a larger speech community, that they wish to disseminate this information to a larger community, or even that they are attempting to guide their audience's interpretations of and conclusions based on this evidence. Evidential perception verbs appear in a number of complementation patterns, and the type of evidence expressed-and consequently the type intersubjective meaning conveyedcan differ from construction to construction (this has been more obvious with the verbs of auditory perception here). The verbs of visual perception can be used to indicate either vision or general observation (direct evidence) on the one hand or more internal mental states like knowledge and inference (indirect evidence) on the other hand. Similarly, the verbs of auditory perception are also capable of signaling either direct (hearing) or indirect (hearsay) evidence. Although diachronic data has been under consideration here, no significant developments in the domain of intersubjective evidential meaning could be detected. And finally, the examples here (mostly from academic texts and newspapers) suggest there may well be genre effects regarding the use we and wir to signal intersubjective evidential meaning, so this is certainly an area deserving further investigation.
